

ROM report

Type of ROM review	Projects and Programmes
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Delegation in charge	Yemen
Status	Final
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Project - Key Information	
Domain (instrument)	N/A
DAC Sector	Rural development
Zone Benefitting from the Action	Yemen
Action Location	Yemen
Type of Project/Programme	Geographic
Geographic Implementation	Single-country
Entity in Charge	DIRECTORATE C - Middle East, Asia and Pacific
OM in Charge	NAGHCHBANDI SHOHREH
Contracting Party	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

Project - Financial data on 16/08/2023			
Total budget	43,790,351 €		
EU contribution	35,000,000 €		
Paid Amount	26,338,943 €	Date of last payment	20/07/2023

Project - Dates				
Contractor Signature Date	22/12/2021			
Activities	Start Date	01/03/2022	End Date	28/02/2025
Final Date for Implementation (FDI)	31/12/2027			

ROM review - Key information				
Reason for ROM review	Yes			
ROM expert(s) name(s)	YODAR Eduardo			
Field phase	Start Date	24/07/2023	End Date	02/08/2023

Executive Summary

After a lengthy but productive inception phase, the Intervention is now halfway through implementation. Progress is so far limited due to a slow start of the projects, which faced complex coordination with the local and central level authorities. Currently the pace of execution is adequate, although there are challenges to mainstream gender, to effectively monitor achievements and systematize practices, and to ensure the commitment of local authorities.

While the socioeconomic needs in most vulnerable locations in Yemen are considerable, the Intervention adequately addresses the key aspects to allow the population to build resilience capacities (food security, livelihood and community development). Establishing a coherent intervention strategy at two levels, community and households, the target groups and final beneficiaries are committed with the objectives of the Intervention while local authorities still face resistance in some aspects.

The EU added value stems from the firm commitment to support the resilience of vulnerable population in Yemen through a coordinated relationship with other European development agencies, in this case the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). Concrete examples of complementarity with humanitarian or development interventions managed by United Nations or local organizations can be identified, while there still room for further identification of synergies.

The design considers learnings from the two previous phases of the programme. The logframe's quality has been improved after the revision done during the Inception Phase. Most elements for the internal monitoring of progress and performance are in place, except for a comprehensive geographical area-based monitoring and programme learning tools.

The implementation progress is now steady, after setting the strategic and operational grounds and leaving most delays behind. The Intervention comprises a large Intervention Team with high operating costs, which is necessary for a smooth and coordinated execution. It is likely that the planned activities will be implemented although financial execution is still lower than expected. While challenges are still ahead and can be identified in certain components, there is a clear vision of how to proceed. The achievement of results in some components, namely in the Agriculture Value Chain, is however uncertain.

The level of ownership, the quality of the capacity building processes and the potential link with private sector initiatives, are some of the common key sustainability factors which vary from component to component. Ownership is already high among final beneficiaries, but the local authorities' commitment varies substantially depending of the component addressed.

Gender equality is in the focus of the Intervention's approach with a gender expert supporting the implementation but the concretion of gender mainstreaming still an important challenge. The Intervention was designed following rights based approach working principles, while environmental issues and climate change are adequately considered.

Communication and visibility have built on previous phases and are developed as initially planned, contributing to knowledge and experience exchange through a digital platform mapping solar energy projects. All Participating United Nations Organizations (PUNOs) are committed to assure that all activities follow the EU visibility guidelines.

Recommendations: 1) Start implementing gender-specific activities outlined in the Gender Action Plan. 2) Design specific monitoring tools in order to discern progress by geographical areas of intervention. 3) Design systematization fiches to capture good practices and lessons learned identified in the implementation of the different projects and synergies among PUNOs. 4) Systematize the coordination experiences and synergies established with the rest of the interventions financed by the EU or other donors.

Project Synopsis

Description of the context with a focus on the problematic to be addressed by the action

Yemen is currently grappling with a protracted humanitarian crisis characterized by armed conflict, political instability, economic decline, and widespread poverty. These challenges have severely impacted the resilience of the Yemeni population, leaving them highly vulnerable to the effects of the crisis.

In economic terms, Yemen ranks among the poorest countries globally, with a staggering 80% of the population in need of humanitarian assistance. The country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has significantly contracted due to the conflict, with an average annual growth rate of -7.6% between 2015 and 2022. This economic downturn has resulted in rampant unemployment, estimated to be around 42%, exacerbating poverty levels and limiting livelihood opportunities for many Yemenis.

Food security is a critical concern in Yemen, with a substantial proportion of the population experiencing severe food insecurity. According to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analysis, approximately 20 million people lack regular access to sufficient and nutritious food. Malnutrition rates are alarmingly high, with nearly half of Yemeni children under the age of five suffering from stunted growth due to chronic malnutrition. Additionally, the Food Consumption Score (FCS) reveals that a significant portion of the population struggles to meet their dietary needs, further undermining their resilience.

Access to basic services, such as healthcare, education, and clean water, is severely constrained in Yemen. The conflict has resulted in extensive damage to infrastructure, including healthcare facilities, schools, and water and sanitation systems. The limited availability and quality of these essential services contribute to increased vulnerability and reduced resilience among the Yemeni population.

The conflict has also disrupted economic activities and hindered trade, leading to a decline in government revenues and foreign exchange reserves. The Yemeni Rial (YER) has depreciated significantly, exacerbating inflationary pressures and making imported goods less affordable for the population. These economic challenges further erode the resilience of households and communities, as they struggle to meet their basic needs and sustain their livelihoods.

Moreover, the conflict has had a detrimental impact on social cohesion and community resilience. Displacement has disrupted social networks and strained community dynamics, leading to increased social tensions and divisions. Trust among community members has been undermined, making collective action and cooperation more challenging. This erosion of social capital hampers the ability of communities to respond effectively to shocks and recover from adversity.

In summary, Yemen is currently facing a multifaceted crisis characterized by armed conflict, economic decline, and widespread poverty. The country's economic indicators reflect a dire situation, with significant unemployment, food insecurity, and limited access to basic services. These challenges, coupled with the erosion of social cohesion, have led to low resilience levels and high vulnerability among the Yemeni population.

The 36-month Intervention, financed under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation instrument, is a Multi-Donor Action, with a grant of 35,000,000 EUR from the EU through a Contribution Agreement and with the Swedish International Developing Cooperation Agency (Sida) contributing with USD 8,766,313. The United Nations Development Programme represented by its Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTF Office), acts as Administrative Agent on behalf of itself and all the Participating UN Organizations of the Programme (Food and Agriculture Organization, International Labour Organization and World Food Programme). Local and International organizations are selected as Implementing Partners of all specific projects under each component.

Description of the intervention logic

Overall Objective: To strengthen resilience of the population in the most vulnerable governorates in Yemen.

Indicators:

- I1. Number of Yemeni vulnerable population in need of livelihoods and food security support (baseline B: 23.4 million (2021) - target T: 22.5 million (2025));
- I2. Average level of targeted communities' capacity of resilience (B: Disaggregated by district in baseline study - T: 10% increase from the baseline value);
- I3. Percentage of people in the targeted communities who report having a sustainable income (B: Disaggregated by type of sector and men/women in baseline study - T: 10% increase from the baseline value);
- I4. Percentage of households in targeted communities with acceptable food consumption score (B: Disaggregated by the head of household's women/men and status in baseline study - T: 10% increase from the baseline value);
- I5. Average Reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI) (B: 11.8 - T: A decrease of 5 points in the rCSI).

Overall Outcome: Improved the management of local risks and shocks in crisis-affected communities of the most vulnerable governorates in Yemen.

Indicators:

- I1.1. Number of targeted communities that report having sufficient access to critical services (B: Disaggregated by critical services in baseline study – T: 75 (60% of targeted communities);
- I1.2. Number of targeted communities that report a reduction in the frequency of conflicts (B: 18 out of 129 (Sample taken in Baseline Study) – T: 15 (60% of targeted communities by 2024);
- I1.3. Estimated number of people who use the infrastructure facilities rehabilitated (disaggregated by women/men) (B: 0 – T: 90,000 by the end of 2024);
- I1.4. Number of people who report having found a job as a result of their involvement in the intervention (in all sectors; disaggregated by women/men and age) (B: 0 – T: 4,500);
- I1.5. Estimated number of people with access to clean/solar energy (matching GEF 2.3) (B: From Households: 267 out of 1215 (Sample) and from Focal Group Discussion and Key Informants Interviews: 9 out of 183 – Sample (129 FGDs participants, 54 KIIs) – T: 30,000.

Intermediate Outcome 1: Increased local institutional resilience management and community social cohesion in crisis-affected communities.

Indicators:

- I1.1.1. Number of targeted community institutions that implement the Community Resilience Plans (CRP) (B: 0 – T: 40);
- I1.1.2. Number of targeted informal self-help groups that become cooperatives (B: 80 – T:50).

Output 1.1: Improved the capacity of community structures and local institutions to strengthen the resilience of the community.

Output 1.2: Communities are equipped with gender-sensitive and culturally appropriate conflict resolution tools.

Intermediate Outcome 2: Broadened access of vulnerable population to sources of energy and job opportunities in the renewable energy sector.

- Indicators: I1.2.1. Number of solar energy systems installed in the communities by technicians from the communities through their micro-enterprises (matching GEF 2.4) (B: 0 – T: 100);
- I1.2.2. Number of targeted entrepreneurs (includes micro-enterprises) working in the solar energy sector disaggregated by women/men (matching GEF 2.6) (B: 0 – T: 500);
- I1.2.3. Number of facilities with access to uninterrupted solar/clean energy (disaggregated by: public facility/household, district, sector and women facilities) (B: 0 – T: 100).

Output 2.1: Increased opportunities for the communities to access clean and renewable energy solutions.

Output 2.2: Broadened the volume of skilled workforce in the sector of renewable energy.

Intermediate Outcome 3: Increased sustainable production and productivity of crop and livestock in crisis-affected communities.

Indicators:

- I1.3.1. Number of targeted farmers producing seeds (disaggregated by women/men and age) (B: 0 – T: 400);
- I1.3.2. Average quantity (kg) of key crops produced per hectare by targeted beneficiaries (B: Defined in Baseline Study – T: 30% increase in yields of supported crops);
- I1.3.3. Area (ha) planted with each crop provided to the targeted beneficiaries (B: Defined in Baseline Study - T: 9,000 ha for Sorghum, 5,000 ha for cowpea and 660 ha for millet);
- I1.3.4. Average quantity (l) of milk produced per animal from targeted beneficiaries (Defined in Baseline Study - T: 50% increase in milk yields of supported goats and sheep);
- I1.3.5 Average number of livestock per targeted household (B: 2 to 3 – T: 6 live goats and sheep).

Output 3.1: Improved capacities in climate smart agriculture (CSA) of farmers vulnerable to climate shocks.

Output 3.2: Strengthened the capacity of vulnerable farming households to develop different agricultural value chains.

Intermediate Outcome 4: Improved access of women, youth, and other vulnerable groups to food and income opportunities.

Indicators:

- I1.4.1. Number of community-based assets established (disaggregated by type) (B: 0 – T: 314);
- I1.4.2. Number of microbusinesses established by women, youth, and other vulnerable groups (disaggregated by women/men entrepreneurs and age) that receive credits/funding from micro-finance institutions (MFIs) (matching GEF 2.17) (B: 0 – T: 3,000).

Output 4.1: Gender-sensitive short-term income opportunities created for vulnerable individuals in the communities.

Output 4.2: Increased capacities of vulnerable individuals to engage in gender-sensitive and culturally appropriate entrepreneurship opportunities.

Output 4.3: Increased capacities of vulnerable individuals to engage in gender-sensitive and culturally appropriate technical and vocational skills development opportunities.

Indicators for each of the outlined Outputs have also been defined. All Indicators, except for I1 are expected to be accomplished by the end of 2024.

Description of the target group(s) and final beneficiaries

The Intervention (ERRY III) aims to reach the total direct beneficiaries of 847,312 from the 17 districts of Hajjah, Hodeidah, Saada, Lahj, Abyan, Mahweet, and Taiz governorates where it is implemented. In consultation with stakeholders, governorates have been selected on the following criteria: access, poverty levels, levels of food insecurity, unemployment and presence of partner agencies.

Target groups includes vulnerable beneficiaries and marginalised communities including Internally Displaced People (IDP), returnees, vulnerable host communities, "Muhamasheen", female-headed households, youth, daily labourers, people with disabilities and elderly community members.

Marginalised youth with limited social and economic opportunities will be targeted to access alternative livelihoods and income opportunities to prevent their recruitment in armed conflicts and violence. From a food security and livelihoods perspective, subsistence farmers/livestock holders and daily labourers will be targeted given their vulnerabilities and contribution towards community and household resilience. The presence of a large youth population with limited employment opportunities fuels alienation and exclusion from the state and economy, and feeds into conflict and instability. Under these circumstances, there is no alternative for some young people but to seek alternative sources of income to support themselves and help their families, making them vulnerable to manipulation by armed criminal or extremist groups operating in Yemen. However, youth have a pivotal role in peace, and development.

Findings

1. Relevance

The Intervention "Supporting Resilient Livelihoods, Food Security and Climate Adaptation in Yemen, Joint Programme (ERRY III)" is the third phase of a Joint Programme (JP) involving four Participating United Nations Organizations (PUNOs): United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Food Programme (WFP), International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). It is supported by the European Union (EU) and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). The projects under each component of the programme are being implemented by local and international organizations, some of which were also involved in the previous phases of this JP. The Implementing Partners (IPs) for Food assistance For Assets (FFA) and Food assistance For Training (FFT) are Relief International (RI), Building Foundation for Development (BFD), Care International and the Small and Micro Enterprise Promotion Service (SMEPS). For local governance and social cohesion components, Social Fund for Development (SFD). For livelihood component, Sustainable Development Foundation (SDF), Life Maker Meeting Place Organization (LMMPO), Tamdeen Youth Foundation (TYF) and For All Foundationj. As regards Agriculture Value Chain (AVC), Sada Foundation for Building & Development, STEPS Foundation for Development, Assistance for Response and Development (ARD) and Sustainable Development Foundation (SDF). Lastly, for Skills & Entrepreneurship Development component, the IPs are Social Fund for Development (SFD) and Ghadaq for Development. Most of these organizations have a sound experience and proven capacity to implement the projects under their responsibility.

This Intervention gives continuity to a process aimed at strengthening the absorptive, adaptive and transformative resilience capacities of vulnerable population in Yemen. Abilities to minimize exposure to shocks and stresses for a population that continues to suffer the dramatic and multidimensional consequences of the conflict and an uncertain future, but also consistent with the humanitarian-development-peace nexus driven by the EU, donors and development agencies in Yemen.

Experience accumulated in the first two phases of the programme has allowed to define a budget adapted to the implementation needs of the different components and PUNOs' structures, as well as to identify aspects to be improved, both at the overall management of the programme and in sectoral components or work streams established for this Intervention. Some of the lessons learned can be clearly identified in the Intervention Strategy (e.g. Mainstreaming social cohesion and conflict sensitivity throughout all the programme interventions) but others are less clearly concretized (e.g. Assuming an area-based approach).

As a JP, ERRY III has the resources and institutional capacity to address different needs and offer solutions that are often complementary for target groups and final beneficiaries (e.g. vocational training and personal grants for job opportunities). However, the numerous stakeholders involved in the implementation (13 IPs plus the four PUNOs), hinder coordination and involve serious challenges for an efficient execution, especially in a short execution period (only three years) in a complex context. In this regard, coherently defined implementation mechanisms are key to program consistency. The Joint Coordination Unit (JCU) helps PUNOs and IPs to uphold an overall vision of the programme and assess synergies between the different projects developed in each component. Sub-national field level officers are also vital positions to pursue coordination among PUNOs. This organizational structure of the programme inevitably increases already high operational costs and adds more staff involved in the implementation of the activities. However, it has also allowed the Intervention to generate, through contracting external consultants, relevant and quality assessments to improve the design (Baseline survey, Sustainability and Exit Strategy, Gender Analysis and Action Plan, ERRY II Impact Assessment or Logframe revision) and facilitates the overall monitoring of the programme.

Implementation mechanisms also relate to the IPs' role, mostly limited to service providers, largely due to the mandatory and generally slow approval process of acceptance from the local authorities. This process limits their capacity to address their work in the areas of intervention with a long-term perspective and thus they mostly just focus on the implementation of specific project activities (between six- and twelve-month contracts). Furthermore, it does limit the capacity of the Intervention to assure mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues, such as gender perspective or inclusion approach. Possible changes of staff or even of the IP through the implementation can further limit the long-term implication of certain IPs.

Although ownership over the objectives of the programme among target groups and final beneficiaries seems guaranteed, resistance faced from authorities at all levels reflect their uncertain commitment to the objectives of the Intervention. Negotiating and establishing agreements with local authorities, including Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation (SCMCHA) in the North and the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) in the South, but also with the different local authorities at sub-district level, is one of the main challenges of the Intervention. Unfortunately, their previous knowledge of the programme objectives and accomplishments does not seem to prevent all PUNOs from having to start all the bureaucratic processes from scratch, having caused significant delays in the implementation. However, those direct beneficiaries already involved in the different activities express their interest and satisfaction with the community-based work done so far and/or with the services provided.

2. Coordination, complementarity and EU added value

Coordination spaces exist and seem to be effective at a strategic level, avoiding duplications and trying to balance resources allocation according to the needs of the most vulnerable areas in the country. ERRY III is a member of the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC), a UN coordination mechanism where coordination with other humanitarian and donor interventions takes place. UNDP leads the established Livelihood Working Group under the FSAC to align the interventions and approaches and develop new ways of working with cluster partners.

As a Joint Programme, the most intense interinstitutional coordination takes place internally, among the different PUNOs. Nevertheless, there is also certain level of coordination among other interventions funded by the EU and other donors. In fact, the Intervention was designed considering complementarity and target areas definition with other ongoing interventions. This is mainly with "The Strengthening Institutional and Economic Resilience in Yemen (SIERY)", also implemented by UNDP, and the ongoing UNDP and World Bank Emergency Crisis Response Project (ECRP), implemented by SFD, one of the IPs in ERRY III, and Public Works Programme (PWP). In general, synergies with complementary interventions are taking place. The ECRP also contributes to livelihoods stabilization, community asset rehabilitation, support to agriculture-based Small Medium Enterprises and strengthening local capacities for service delivery. Under this Intervention's Output 4.1 (short-term income opportunities), the ILO signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with SFD and PWP to pilot the integration of the Employment Intensive Investment Programme (EIIP) into existing cash for work and FFA interventions. In coordination with experts from all agencies, an international consultant will develop an EIIP Standard Operating Procedure after reviewing the existing manuals used by SFD and PWP (Cash for Work, Community Contracting, Environmental and Social Safeguards, and Occupational Safety and Health Manuals) and WFP FFA manuals.

Meanwhile, SIERY, designed to buttress the resilience of local governance systems in Yemen, focuses capacity building and institutional strengthening work at the districts and governorate level, while ERRY III focuses work at the community and sub district level, trying to avoid duplication and establishing the grounds for future complementarities on local governance planning exercises. The two interventions are thought to enhance capacity of local institutions and governance system on economic resilience building, livelihoods, food security, gender equality and climate adaptation.

The Intervention was further envisioned to also coordinate and complement humanitarian relief interventions by targeting vulnerable households and communities that have not already been targeted in the humanitarian response through provision of livelihoods opportunities, protecting of productive assets, and building coping mechanisms and resilience by linking resilience with humanitarian interventions. "The Food Security Response and Resilience (FSRRP) in Yemen", recently launched and jointly implemented by FAO, UNDP and WFP, is an example, complementing the Livelihood or Agriculture Value Chain (AVC) component of this Intervention.

At operational level, complementarities can also be identified with WFP's food for school programme, which provides food for needy trainees (particularly targeted women) who attend trainings organized by ERRY III programme for Skills & Entrepreneurship Development component of ERRY III.

Internal coordination among the different PUNOs takes place mainly in the JCU, as well as in other ad-hoc meetings (see efficiency section).

EU added value through the Intervention lays in that it certifies a firm commitment to supporting resilience building initiatives in Yemen and to facilitate a further coordinated relationship with Sida. Both entities have supported the different phases of the programme contributing to slowly settle the grounds for country stability under the nexus humanitarian-development-peace building logic. Officials from both entities attend the Steering Committee meetings and closely follow up the implementation, maintaining close communication with the Joint Programme Manager.

3. Intervention logic, Monitoring & Learning

The Intervention's design takes into account the past experiences of the two first ERRY phases. This is mostly clearly reflected in the sectoral components chosen, all considered to be key strategies in enhancing resilience capacities of vulnerable population in Yemen.

In the contract's Description of the Action (DoA) or in ERRY II Impact Assessment, conclusions and recommendations are of very different nature. While some relate to general management and planning issues, such as the need for a stronger Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) System or the need to increase synergies among PUNOs, others aimed on specific issues regarding sectoral components of the Intervention, such as, increasing links between Micro Small Medium Entrepreneurs (MSMEs) with financial Institutions, service providers and other private sector institutions. Regarding internal management of the Intervention, more human resources have been assigned this time to improve the monitoring, the coordination for synergies between PUNOs or mainstreaming of gender perspective. However, each of these aspects shows different levels of effectiveness. On the other hand, there are strategic aspects that have been impossible to finally consider. For example, the coherent recommendation to increase the percentage of districts and sub-districts targeted by all four PUNOs interventions (70% compared to 50% in ERRY II). Actually, less than half of ERRY III districts (eight out of seventeen) can be considered "model" districts (all PUNOs implementing at least one component) and only in three out of 17 districts all seven sectoral components are targeted (Najrah in Hajjah, Ahwar in Abyan and Al' Mafer in Taizz). This shows the challenges faced by the Intervention while having to reconcile strategic decisions with the authorities' perspective and interests, and the difficulties to implement with an Area-Based approach (another of the recommendations defined). To effectively do so, IPs have short implementation time to actually build a deep understanding of the populations' needs and to consolidate community cohesion and governance structures. Challenges in getting permits on time for the implementation and signing sub agreement between IPs and SCMCHA in Sana'a, place pressure of IPs to implement concrete activities, hindering multisector approaches and development processes.

During the Inception Phase, the logical framework of the Intervention was carefully revised; now the description of the Intervention Strategy is better reflected and a more coherent logic of intervention exists. This revision included the definition of an improved set of indicators to measure progress at all levels (Impact, Outcome, Intermediate Outcomes and Outputs), facilitating the monitoring and evaluation of the Intervention. The result chain is well structured and adequately translates the strategy: the planned activities allow to obtain the outputs, which lead to the intermediate outcomes and the outcome; the latter contributes to the impact. Results are appropriately formulated and take into account gender and human rights considerations. The set of indicators is sufficient for measuring the results.

Assumptions were also revised during the Inception Phase and the set defined in the original DoA, with External and Internal level Assumptions and a detailed description of Strategic Risks and mitigation measures, are still valid for the Intervention's risk management. Risks included refer to political, security, conflict, financial and operational levels.

The M&E System of the Intervention involves the contributions and inputs of JCU, PUNOs and IPs technical staff, and under it, several tools have been developed to allow a close monitoring of the implementation. A M&E Plan clearly establishes the activities, key tasks and their frequency and responsibility of everyone involved, while the M&E framework and an Indicators Tracking Table (ITT), allow to monitor against the logframe indicators, including gender-specific targets while ensuring disaggregated data will be maintained for gender-related analysis. However, the Gender Action Plan includes other specific indicators for gender activities proposed which are not being monitored yet.

The M&E workplan does not include the projects' chronogramme in all the components. While it is understandable that not all projects implemented can be accurately planned (some of them depend on others to finish first and approval processes are unpredictable), the M&E system coordinated with the overall workplan could help to foresee action needed to coordinate with donor or with other interventions. Furthermore, the M&E system lacks the capacity to generate data to properly follow up on the impact of the intervention in each geographical area (village, "uzal", districts, governorate) along with quantitative or qualitative data on beneficiaries' participation in each component or with specific data and information on the role of women, youth, Internally Displaced People (IDP), person with disabilities (PwD) in each activity, coherent with the inclusion approach mentioned in the Intervention's design. The quality of reporting to the donor is affected by the lack of this kind of information.

The financial reports are prepared by the Administrative Agent (UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office) fulfilling the formal commitment and presenting consolidate expenditure by budget line. However, the financial information available is not crossed with the actual implementation of the activities, hindering the possibility of a cost-effective analysis of the implementation at a given point.

Further tools are also missing to record the Intervention as a learning process (good practices or lessons learned identified in each project and sectoral component or on synergies established).

4. Efficiency

Despite the consolidated implementation mechanisms in place, the delays in the implementation and the high operational costs limit the efficiency of the intervention so far.

The Intervention benefits from the full capacity and expertise of all four PUNOs in each of the sectoral components or work streams identified. 36 staff members from UNDP, FAO, ILO and WFP are involved in one way or the other (all full time except five WFP staff) in the planning and technical supervision of the IPs work with the communities. Six of these UNDP staff members are fully committed to the JCU and another two field officers are in Hodeida (North) and Aden (South) to assist PUNOs teams as Joint Sub National Coordinators.

The implementation mechanisms are clearly defined, and all stakeholders perfectly understand their roles and responsibilities in the programme. The JCU (Joint Programme Manager, Communication Specialist, M&E Reporting Specialist, Finance Specialist, Gender Officer and JP Administration Officer) is key to the consistency and coherence of the JP. They meet weekly and they have monthly or ad-hoc meetings with PUNOs' staff members when necessary.

Other internal coordination mechanisms are also clearly defined and working properly, with bimonthly or ad-hoc meetings taking place to assure that PUNOs assess potential synergies among their different interventions and that cross cutting-issues (especially gender perspective) are properly mainstreamed in operational work plans. A Gender Working Group was formed with the participation of gender focal points appointed by each PUNO and of the Gender Officer recruited by the JCU. So far, synergies at the operational level may include solar systems managed by UNDP and made available to community assets (health facilities or schools) rehabilitated under FFA component, managed by WFP, or ILO and FAO sharing their value chain assessments and commonly developing strategies and action plans. In this regard, the lack of geographical area-based approach does not allow to capture the effects of synergies and complementarities developed.

Implementation started in March 2022. In a lengthy Inception Phase (seven months), a joint identification of target areas allowed all PUNOs to implement activities in most of the seventeen districts targeted and for all to be present in at least one district of all seven governorates. During this time, preliminary activities included launching of the programme in the southern and northern regions, initial consultations with relevant authorities, IP selection or AVC inputs procurement. It also was used to finalize staff recruitment but, most importantly, this period allowed to produce relevant assessment and strategic documents: ERRY II impact assessment, baseline study, sustainability and exit strategy, gender analysis and the revision of the logical framework represented important milestones for a well-arranged implementation. Certainly, all these consultancy works contributed to improve the design, including the monitoring tools later elaborated based on their findings. Unfortunately, the elaboration process added delays to the beginning of the implementation in the intervention areas. For example, the intervention logic (Intermediate Outcomes expected) had to be defined before sending the letters of agreements to public authorities and institutions.

Since October 2022, when effective implementation started after the finalisation of the Inception Phase, the main activities executed are those under the local governance and the FFA components.

The main problem so far is that despite the experience accumulated in subsequent phases and the existence of a solid programme structure, PUNOs have not been able to avoid delays in the beginning of the implementation of almost all components of the Intervention. Delays mostly due to long selection process of the IPs in some cases, approval process of project activities and the selected IPs from SCMCHA in the North but also in the south with certain components (especially under AVC projects) and the fact that certain projects are linked to others (e.g. apprenticeship to be implemented with targeted FFA beneficiaries which have to finish first the FFA projects). Delays in certain projects or activities affect the others as sequencing is required. For example, the Cash Plus intervention from the ILO apprenticeship program, targets WFP FFA beneficiaries, so the apprenticeship component should only start after FFA participants have finished the six-month public work or ILO cooperative component demand-based capacity building trainings to the producer groups established by FAO. Negotiation capacity is constantly required by both PUNOs and the IPs staff, to manage themselves boldly depending on each context. De facto local authorities in the North scrutinize all proposed action, including the selection of trainers, training materials or registration forms. They actually impose criteria such as trainers being from the same governorate (Hodeida). Security concerns can also cause delays in inaccessible or hard to access areas and security incidents having happened, including a stolen car from SFD just a month ago.

Latest financial data available (31 March 2023) showed that 78% of the first year's budget was spent, i.e. 21.94% of the total budget, with one third of the implementation time having elapsed. The lack of more precise financial information hinders understanding the implications of these delays. However, it can be noted that the "Operating and Other Direct Costs" budget line almost doubled the expected budget for Year 1 (177% of the corresponding first year budget), due to the need to intensify coordination among PUNOs and with IPs and local authorities to try to move forward in the implementation.

5. Effectiveness

The limited level of implementation to date makes it difficult to assess whether Intervention will achieve the planned results. However, in the event that the IPs continues its current pace of execution, significant progress towards the achievement of all four Intermediate Outcomes can be expected.

Halfway through the implementation period, start-up delays and the implementation challenges are mostly being overcome but progress in Outputs' (Op) delivery has only been especially remarkable in local governance component, as reported against the respective logframe indicators.

It is likely that local institutional resilience management and community social cohesion (IOC1) will increase although there are risks for achieving this outcome. To date, 44 Community Resilience Plans (CRPs) have been elaborated at the sub-district level and the 308 at the village level, which are key for planning PUNOs' interventions in the targeted areas, allowing joint identification of prioritized projects. SFD (IP responsible for the implementation in all 17 districts) guarantees not only reaching sub-districts and villages but a solid quality of the CRPs produced. While 199 community representatives have increased their knowledge on social cohesion, conflict mitigation and resolution, this cohesion component faces the challenge, especially in the northern districts, of institutionalizing the figure of community insider mediators, as local authorities consider conflict resolution as one of their responsibilities.

It is uncertain to what extent access of vulnerable population to sources of energy and job opportunities in the renewable energy sector will be broadened (IOc2), since the evolution of the renewable energy component largely depends on the outcomes of the CRPs and energy need assessments for public services facilities. However, progress is slowly being made and a clear added value of a joint program can be identified. 80 Cash for Work (C4W) and FFA beneficiaries have become certified as solar energy technicians, under a well-established synergy and coordinated work between UNDP and WFP. Meanwhile, FAO and UNDP study how to address the provision of energy solutions for dairy production groups and centres, including use of energy-efficient equipment to save energy and reduce costs. To date there is no progress in none of the three IOc2 indicators.

It is also unclear to what extent the sustainable production and productivity of crop and livestock will increase (IOc3), because the development of the AVC component has suffered delays in North and South, and FAO has difficulties in agreeing with the Agriculture Research and Extensions Authority (AREA) to move forward and promote climate smart agriculture (CSA) under output 3.1. Also, local authorities have questioned the introduction of seeds from different governorates, and it is not clear at this time if FAO's suggestion to use a local seed bank to collect seeds from local communities and make them available to farmers when needed, will be finally accepted. On the other hand, procurement processes have been properly solved, while beneficiaries already express that dairy marketing and processing centres are showing increase in the availability and improvement of quality of dairy products (output 3.2), positively impacting the local economy. Further testimonies also valued the improvement of crop yields as a result of the distribution of agricultural inputs and of farming practices as a result of the agricultural extension services and Farmer Field School program. To date there is no progress in none of the five IOc3 indicators.

It likely that access of vulnerable groups to food and income opportunities (IOc4) will improve, since the effectiveness of entrepreneurship and apprenticeship of ILO interventions do also rest on the extensive experience gained through previous ERRY phases and on the ability to link business developments to private sectors initiatives and financial support. Furthermore, mainstreaming gender perspective remains a challenge in this component. Women are still limited to training on food processing, clothing production, cosmetics or hairdressing entrepreneurship while they do express interests in design work, fast food establishments or computer and mobile repair (for example). To date there is progress in one of the two IOc4 indicators.

Based on priorities identified in CRPs, rehabilitation or construction of community assets is the kind of activity that the authorities welcome and facilitate. The rehabilitation of schools in Tuban district are highly appreciated by the beneficiaries interviewed during the mission, who consider them necessary to improve a learning environment for children. Rehabilitation of roads and water resources are also underway and should face no problem to continue being delivered.

In terms of inclusiveness of the results, the lack of a geographical area-based monitoring tool hampers the possibility of understanding the particular evolution of each component in villages or districts and does not produce quality data regarding women, youth, IDPs or PwD's participation in each component. Until this analysis is not done, it should be difficult to determine the real extent to which population improve management of local risks and shocks in crisis-affected communities (Intervention Overall Outcome), although chances of reaching expected indicators targets for this Outcome are high. Also, previous impact assessments have shown the development of the different strategies put in place by ERRY does have an effect of resilience capabilities, especially on transformative capacity, which is related to governance mechanisms, policies, infrastructure, community networks, and formal safety nets that are part of the wider system in which Households and communities are embedded. It is therefore likely that the Intervention will contribute as intended to strengthen the resilience of the population in the targeted governorates.

6. Sustainability

The sustainability of the benefits and services generated will depend on how implementation evolves until the end date. The integration of sustainability in the strategy (a fairly comprehensive sustainability and exit strategy was elaborated during the Inception Phase) is key to increase the continuity of services and assets provided by the Intervention. This strategy clearly identifies and describes sustainability elements and exit milestones for all projects consider under every component, further identifying how sustainability elements were considered during the Intervention's design. The sustainability strategy coherently focuses on the community level (households and structures). By enhancing community-based structures and their capacity for planning, protecting food security, rehabilitating community assets, climate change adaption or creating livelihood opportunities, the Intervention addresses specific dimensions of fragility and their root causes and will definitely increase resilience to shocks and pressure. Links and actions with local institutions and private business sector (especially financial institutions) are also considered while less relevance is given to the role of civil society organizations (CSO), including IPs. Unfortunately, the lack of long-term certainties over the resources available to remain in each territory (subject to temporary agreements) hinders the possibility of consolidating IPs presence and role in further development processes.

Certainly, each of the projects to be implemented under every component of the Intervention faces particular challenges and potential for sustainability. Common elements of sustainability can be generally identified in the level of ownership acquired by beneficiaries and community-based structures (VCC and Sub-district Committees) or in capacity building activities to adapt to the beneficiaries' needs and the level of success in linking personal initiatives to consolidated private sector businesses and/or micro financial institutions. All four PUNOs have learned from past experiences and are sharing with IPs the specific lessons learned in each project but the implementation of some of the projects do seem limited to consolidate capacity building processes.

Local governance and social cohesion projects will heavily depend on the level of ownership of Community Resilience Plans by Village Community Committees (VCCs) and Sub-district Committees. UNDP's and SFD's proven experience and expertise will certainly contribute to enhancing community leaders' management capacities. However, local governance and social cohesion requires solid and trusting relationships between the population, community leaders and authorities (as seen with the community insider mediator figure), especially in a conflict context; two and a half years of effective work could prove insufficient to consolidate an improved performance of local governance structures.

The sustainability of the renewable energy component and of the solar system solutions proposed will also strongly depend on the ownership acquired by the local authorities and the communities, but even more on the capacities build in those structures to manage the systems financially and technically (including community owned solar mini grids or solar water system plants). This will be ensured since operation and maintenance training of all systems were, according to the sustainability and exit strategy, included in the design of the project activities and budget allocation. Regarding solar microbusinesses, beneficiaries will also be trained on businesses and entrepreneurship, and they will be equipped, while they will receive financial grants to establish their own initiatives.

In the livelihood component, access to financial schemes from institutions with experience in service and rural communities during and after the Intervention will be key for the sustainability of the beneficiaries' initiatives. The focus on youth and women to receive technical training for starting and managing income projects (including capacity building to develop business plans for their income projects) is a promising approach. The partnership with CSOs with nationwide access and experience in services for MSMEs to run and operate the online and ecommerce initiatives, is one of the few sustainability elements related with the CSOs' role.

Regarding Vocational & Entrepreneurs Skills Development, close coordination with Technical and Vocational Education and Training Ministry (TVET) institutions is a key element to sustain the projects under this component. ILO therefore supervises that training follows best practices and quality assurance protocols, procedures, and processes, conducting regular monitoring and supervision in collaboration with project key stakeholders. It seems that this is somehow challenging as vocational training institutes involved in apprenticeship or entrepreneurship trainings often want to enforce their own staff, materials, and trainers, hindering the IP's implementation approaches. The good management of this relationship will influence the sustainability options of these initiatives.

As regards to FFA or FFT assistance components, community assets selection is well aligned with the authority's priorities. Operation and maintenance of assets rely on the ownership and commitment achieved in the different community structures.

Under the AVC component, CSA will certainly face the challenge of promoting and consolidating new approaches for local farmers. Again, more time to consolidate new practices through close supervision and technical assistance would have seemed advisable. Certainly, capacities build upon AREA extension staff to help farmers access information on agronomic practices for adaptation to climate shocks, better livestock, crop production, improve food and livelihood security, seem key to the sustainability of CSA in the intervention areas.

7. Cross-cutting issues

A comprehensive gender assessment was conducted during Inception phase and a Gender Action Plan was drafted accordingly, with gender specific activities and gender approach to be delivered throughout the implementation. Soon after, a Gender Strategy was outlined to round up the planning tools for a gender sensitive intervention. Furthermore, the logframe revision explicitly described specific Intermediate Outcomes and Outputs to improve access of women, youth, and other vulnerable groups to food and income opportunities. A set of gender-specific targets for all relevant indicators of the logframe were defined and included in the M&E plan, establishing targets between 30% and 70% of women participation depending on the activity. A Gender Officer was also incorporated under the JCU unit and a Gender Working Group was established with a gender focal point from each PUNO.

Despite all these efforts, gender perspective mainstreaming continues to be a challenge for the Intervention. Implementation of gender specific activities outlined in the Gender Action Plan are only expected to start being planned in October 2023 and disaggregated data are not available for the indicators where this was planned. Implementation of projects in each component strongly rely on the PUNOs and IPs staff capacity to consider and understand gender perspective beyond women's participation in concrete activities. Gender equality faces strong resistance from local authorities, especially in the North but also in the South. PUNOs and IPs women staff have limited mobility and are closely watched and obliged to comply with the mandate of travelling with a "mahram" (male guardian). Considering this "hostile" context, every chance to mainstream gender perspective without risks for women's integrity must be harnessed. However, examples can be identified where this is not being the case. Under the entrepreneurship component, women are still limited to food processing, clothing production, cosmetics, and hairdressing; a transformative gender approach would require, among others, women to explore other traditionally male professions such as computer and mobile repair, and women themselves have already expressed interest in these trainings during the ROM review mission and previous EU Delegation visits.

There are other examples of efforts that the Intervention has actually carried out to improve women leadership. During the IPs' selection process, women-led organizations were prioritized to implement projects in the components implemented by UNDP and WFP, to encourage women participation and other CSOs were encouraged to incorporate women in the leadership positions. This kind of decisions and giving visibility to women initiatives (as it was and continues to be the case with done with Iman Al Hadi) are still possible during the implementation period.

The Intervention's design and implementation mainstream adequately the working principles of the Rights Based Approach (RBA). Participation and access to decision making is a keystone to all projects implemented at community level, especially under local governance and social cohesion components. All PUNOs follow a policy of non-discriminatory and equal access to the benefits to be generated through the Intervention and CRPs are aligned with rules, policies and laws from the different administrative levels (village, sub-districts and districts). The Intervention promotes 'transparency', by publishing periodic information on the implementation and sharing it through its web page.

There are several ways in which the Intervention is targeting environmental constraints and opportunities. Sustainable and climate-resistant crop production systems are identified and promoted; they require less water use, also resulting in equal or higher net incomes for farmers. Regarding water use, VCCs play an active role in the identification, implementation and management of activities that contribute to water conservation, sanitation, tree planting and other environmentally sustainable initiatives. FAO provides technical and institutional support for the establishment of Water User Associations (WUAs), responsible for managing and rehabilitating of water infrastructures within their communities. These WUAs raise awareness on the sustainable management and use of water resources while protecting the livelihoods of rural farmers.

Access to renewable energy systems and solutions for the population provide job opportunities but also clean energy for community infrastructures, contributing to climate change mitigation. A mapping platform was developed to bring online documentation of the renewable energy interventions for all stakeholders interested. On the other hand, climate change adaption is one of the most relevant keystones of this Intervention. Stakeholders and communities' awareness on climate change risks, adaption and mitigation measures is being raised. CSA is being prioritized, including use of improved, tolerant, and high yield crop/fodder seeds. CSA groups will be established to enable farmers to place a range of locally appropriate climate change adaptation and mitigation measures as well as environmental protection practices. Also under AVChange component, the use of locally produced and environmentally friendly organic pesticides such as Neem Oil will be encouraged and even provided by FAO to the farmers.

Regarding the risk of worsening conflict dynamics, confront violence and lack of human security, all PUNOs strictly follow security plans and procedures and "Do no harm" (i.e., not exposing people to additional risks through the intervention). Community work or solutions provided to beneficiaries should not worsen existing conflicts or tensions. The programme could actually contribute to promote peace and dialogue by providing job opportunities, facilitating community dialogue, enhancing inclusion and providing opportunities for collaboration around the intervention's implementation.

8. Communication and visibility

The coordination of all Communication and Visibility issues relies on the Communication Specialist, part of the JCU Team. He elaborated the Communication Plan shared with all PUNOs, which effectively outlines objectives, target audiences, communication tools, outputs, activities, and targets. Communication Annual Plans are also drafted. The Communication Specialist also creates and posts social media content on social media platforms, while he disseminates press releases to all internal and external audience utilizing PUNOs social media platforms.

The communication of the Intervention stands out infographics and fact sheets which demonstrate a good ability for systematization. The same can be identified in clear and useful programme progress briefs, already produced in previous faces of the programme. Three of these programme reports briefs have been produced during ERRY III and are available in a friendly website (recently also in Arabic). These reports allow to share periodic and updated information (every five or six months). Alongside with these publications, it is also possible to find in the web site articles on specific activities, stories from beneficiaries or press releases. Videos from previous phases of the programme can also be found in the web site, well describing the activities implemented and highlighting impact on different areas.

In all these communication outputs and all other resources produced (site bags, notebooks, shirts, jackets, memory cards, signs, banners, clothing or toolkits), the Intervention adequately complies with the EU visibility guidelines, and the financial contribution of the donors is properly acknowledged in all cases. The same holds true for promotional materials produced and distributed among PUNOs.

The Intervention also keeps operative the platform (<https://solarinventar.info>), and the mapping of solar interventions is shared with other agencies interested in solar energy projects in Yemen. This platform helps to identify the energy gaps and to take informed decisions for implementing the solar energy projects where they are needed and for avoiding duplicities.

The lack of systematized good practices or lessons learned or geographic consolidated data, as part of the M&E system, limits the impact of Communication outputs.

Conclusions	
N°	Conclusion
C1	Relevance: The Intervention addresses the most relevant risks and shocks faced by the targeted population. A social cohesion component enhances the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus within the Intervention Strategy of this third phase of ERRY. The implementation mechanisms are adequate to achieve the planned objectives even if several Implementing Partners are involved and to profit from the added value of a Joint Programme through the central role of the Joint Coordination Unit. It is challenging though to implement the Intervention in three years in a difficult context and unfortunately, the partial support of local authorities limits the long-term involvement of Implementing Partners, whose role is still limited to service providers. While there is high level of ownership by the target groups and final beneficiaries, the previous phases of ERRY have not ensured the necessary commitment of local authorities, which affects implementation.
C2	Coordination, complementarity and EU added value: Coordination with other interventions, focused on local governance, livelihoods, agriculture value chain or food security, is ensured through the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC), a UN coordination mechanism. Effective coordination with relevant interventions (some of which are the same PUNOs involved in this programme) is ensured, especially with UNDP's initiatives "SIERY" and "ECRP" where target groups and areas definition and methodological synergies can be identified but not being systematized by the Intervention. The EU added value lays in the Intervention's firm commitment to supporting resilience building initiatives in Yemen and to facilitate a further coordinated relationship with other European development agencies as Sida. EU and Sida, coherently with their institutional principles and policies, also play a role in positioning women's empowerment in the Intervention.
C3	Intervention logic, Monitoring & Learning: The Intervention's design considered learnings and lessons learned from the two previous phases of the programme, some of them being more clearly reflected at a strategic and operational level than others. The revision of the logframe has improved the quality of the results chain and indicators available at all levels; the logframe translates adequately the intervention logic and is a valid monitoring management tool. All relevant stakeholders are promptly involved in the M&E system. Different monitoring tools are available to follow progress against the logframe indicators but specific tools are lacking to monitor implementation by intervention areas, specific projects schedule and against financial data. Further tools to identify good practices or lessons learned and/or on synergies established are also lacking. Specific monitoring tools to measure progress in gender perspective are available but data is not being registered yet.
C4	Efficiency: The Inception phase was effectively utilized to refine the Intervention Strategy, producing relevant assessments, studies and documents. Despite also starting the socialization of the programme among the authorities in North and South and progress made in the selection process of the IPs, the erratic response of authorities on approvals of IPs and activities caused delays at the beginning of the implementation. The pace of execution is picking up and it seems possible that the pending activities will be implemented until the contract's end date, although there are still external challenges that could still hinder implementation. Internal coordination mechanisms add to the high operating costs of the programme but are essential to give consistency and coherence to the Intervention. According to the latest data available (March2023), budget execution is somewhat behind the implementation schedule.
C5	Effectiveness: Progress in Outputs' delivery is still fairly limited but consistent progress has been made however in the definition of CRPs, a key element to set up the grounds for project implementation in all components. The Intervention is oriented towards achieving the results and allowing IPs to help improve management of local risks and shocks to target groups through specific project implementation. It is unclear whether all results will be achieved, as there are significant challenges in the Social Cohesion (questioning of Community insider mediator figure by authorities in the North) and in the Agriculture Value Chain components (resistance to specific strategies developed to promote Climate Smart Agriculture). The lack of more decisive gender mainstreaming could question the influence of the Intervention's inclusive approach. Despite difficulties with authorities, the Outputs can effectively influence the policy and actions at the end of the implementation.
C6	Sustainability: Due to the limited progress in implementation, it is still early to assess the sustainability prospects. The variety of sectoral components means that sustainability depends on many different factors. Adequately, the sustainability strategy focuses at community level, exit strategies have been designed and sustainability elements have been incorporated in the design. The relevance of all components addressed by the Intervention and the testimonies captured during the ROM review mission suggest a solid ownership of the Intervention's objectives by the target groups and final beneficiaries, leading to positive sustainability prospects. However, the short duration of the Intervention (three years) and the delay in the start of various projects may limit the consolidation of capacity building and community development processes, affecting thus the sustainability perspectives.
C7	Cross-cutting issues: While the Intervention intends to address gender equality mainstreaming in all its projects and resources have been set up to do so, there are challenges to fully mainstream gender since local authorities show resistance to some aspects. On the other hand, relevant sex disaggregated data is often not recorded. Implementation of gender specific activities outlined in the Gender Action Plan are only expected to start being implemented in October 2023. The Intervention design and implementation adequately mainstream the working principles of the Rights-Based Approach. Environmental issues and climate change adaptation are being addressed in several components of the Intervention. PUNOs experience limit the likelihood of the Intervention inadvertently worsening conflict dynamics.
C8	Communication and visibility: The communication and visibility activities respond to the guidelines established in the Communication and Visibility Plan. A Communication Specialist is responsible for the management of all Communications Outputs (web page, social media content, press releases) and the Intervention effectively utilizes all PUNOs' social media platforms. The Intervention's web page has improved its presentation compared to previous phases and continues to present periodic programme progress briefs, which often include high quality and very useful infographics and fact sheets. The mapping of solar energy projects in the platform https://solarinventar.info , elaborated in previous programme phases, continues to operate, and it helps interested institutions to identify the energy gaps, avoid duplicities and take informed decisions for implementing the solar energy projects. EU visibility is adequately ensured in all the deliverables and in the organisation of activities.

Recommendations					
#	Linked to	Recommendation	To whom	Priority	Importance
R1	7	Give priority to the implementation of gender-specific activities outlined in the Gender action Plan. For those activities already been implemented, measure achievements reached against targets established. Ensure that the data collected are sex-disaggregated. (Recommendation also linked to C3 and C5).	Joint Coordination Unit (JCU) and PUNOs Chief Technical Officers or Project Managers	Short term	High
R2	3	Design specific monitoring tools that will allow to discern progress in targets and accomplishments by geographical areas of intervention. Consider the possibility of linking it to a mapping exercise of projects by component in each area.	Joint Coordination Unit (JCU) M&E Reporting Specialist	Short term	Medium

R3	3	Design systematization fiches, which will help to capture good practices and lessons learned identified in the implementation of the different projects. Give priority to the good practices and lessons learned that show the contribution of women to community development processes. Do the same to capture synergies among PUNOS, establishing complementarity categorizations (approaches, methodologies, activities), in order to try to highlight the added value of Joint Programmes.	Joint Coordination Unit (JCU) M&E Reporting Specialist	Short term	Medium
R4	2	Systematize the coordination experiences and synergies established with the rest of the interventions financed by the EU or other donors. Establish complementarity categorizations (approaches, methodologies, activities).	Joint Coordination Unit (JCU) M&E Reporting Specialist	Medium term	Low

Scoring overview

Relevance	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	
					
Coordination, complementarity and EU added value	2.1	2.2			
					
Intervention logic, Monitoring & Learning	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.5
					
Efficiency	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.4	
					
Effectiveness	5.1	5.2	5.3	5.4	5.5
					
Sustainability	6.1	6.2	6.3	6.4	
					
Cross-cutting issues	7.1	7.2	7.3	7.4	7.5
					
Communication and visibility	8.1				
					